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IT-security has become a key topic for nearly every company nowadays. To safeguard 
security, investments in technical and organizational infrastructures have to be made. 
The efficiency and effectiveness of these investments can often be hardly determined due 
to the invisibility of their benefits. When implementing IT-security measures, the 
predicted outcome, e.g. prevented losses, is uncertain in two ways. First it is not certain 
that one measure and the corresponding investment will prevent a certain risk to occur in 
the future and second the seriousness of the prevented incident is hard to calculate. In 
research and practice the calculation of ROSI (Return on Security Investments) is 
recommended. A vital discussion about different approaches to calculate this ratio can be 
observed. Within this article we argue that existing approaches lack of a sound 
theoretical base for calculating this ratio. We therefore apply principles of capital 
budgeting to present a framework to enable decision support when investing in IT-
security measures. This framework comprises means of simulation in order to take the 
uncertainty of the investment situation into account. By sensibility analysis and Risk-
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IT-Security has become a vital factor for companies nowadays. The importance of this topic in practice can be read of the 
over proportional rise of spending for IS security budgets in comparison to all IS budgets (BSI 2000, p. 122). The question of 
economic efficiency is mostly neglected when planning and implementing IS security measures (BSI 2000, p. 154). The 
general necessity of profitability analysis is emphasised in later works, but the existing insights in this field of research can be 
characterised as “vague”, “useless” or without a relation to concrete recommendations for action (Peltier 2001, p. 5). As an 
indicator of economic efficiency of IS security measurements, a number of specific challenges become apparent. The 
contribution to profit or loss of one single security measure cannot be evaluated in an isolated way, because they are normally 
part of a package of measures (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 18). Decisions concerning IS security measures are intended as or perceived 
to be broad investment decisions (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 18). For such a long-term-examination, direct and indirect in- and out-
payments, have to be considered (Grob 1993). There are problems with the quantification of the in-payments, while it is 
easier to identify direct out-payments of an investment in IS security measures. The in-payments, as they mainly prevent 
future damage, may never result in positive returns (Rodewald 2005, p. 140; McCumber 2005, pp. 192-196). In addition to 
that, there are interdependencies to other parts of the information system. To regard the economic efficiency of IS security 
measures the adoption of a broad and multi-periodic view is needed. 
Based on a literature review, we first give an overview on existing approaches to calculate the return on security investments. 
These findings are applied in order to derive the characteristics of the decision situation and their corresponding requirements 
for decision support. We then introduce a framework for calculating the return on security investments on a capital budgeting 
base to meet the derived requirements. Within this framework, relevant factors are taken into account neglected in traditional 
approaches, for example tax payments and specific interest rates. This framework includes means of handling uncertainty by 
applying simulation methods as well. To demonstrate this framework a calculation of the return of security investments for 




Overview on Approaches to Calculate the Return on Security Investments 
 
 
In the following, the approaches presented in the literature and their identified requirements are examined. An established 
approach is used to calculate the reduction of the expected loss. Investments in IS security measures give no immediate 
return, but help avoid unwanted incidents and prevent loss. This approach became popular due to the 1979 publication of the 
“Guideline for Automatic Data Processing Risk Analysis” by the National Bureau of Standards. The top figure, Annual Loss 












S(Ei) Monetary loss caused by event Ei 
Fi Probability of Ei 
 
The ALE-concept was used in the 80s in America, mainly because of its endorsement by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST). The phase-out of these projects led the concept to fall into oblivion (Nowey et al. 2005, p. 17). Soo 
Hoo names the main reasons for the failure of the ALE concept: an exaggerated level of detail and high complexity of the 
model, the strong dependence of the model on a completed data pool and the inherent presumption and that all tables are 
deterministic and well-known (Soo Hoo 2000, pp. 7-9). Other authors criticized the lack of empirical data on the expected 
loss (Mercury 2003). 
The second generation approaches (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 9) resulted out of the recognition that ALE is impracticable. These can 
be characterized by a reduction of complexity compared to the ALE concept. Exemplarily, the Integrated Business-Risk 
Management Framework, pure value based methodologies, scenario-analysis and best practice approaches should be named. 
The non-technical Integrated Business-Risk Management Framework deals with the IS security risks analogous to common 
business-risks (operational, financial, etc.). This is inadequate to the specifics of the problem. Value based methodologies 
focus only on the possible amount of loss of one event without a consideration of the incidence rate, so that a total 
quantification of the risk is impossible. Scenario-analysis focuses only on one or on a small number of threats and does not 
allow an evaluation to have broad investments. The Best Practice approach as a standardized procedure does not allow the 
consideration of individual specifics. None of these approaches is suitable for decision support, because none quantifies the 
benefit of IS security investments or regards important variables, like business impact or interest rates (Wang 2005). 
Important aspects are not considered in the following approaches, as, e. g. those of Gordon and Loeb (2002) or Cavusoglu, 
Mishra and Raghunathan (2004). The model of Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan focuses e. g. only on decisions about 
intrusion detection systems. Parameterizing these models is very expensive (Soo Hoo 2000). For these reasons no decision 
support is possible. The approaches did not gain any significance for measuring IS security investments. Thus, there is still 
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demand for a suitable method to evaluate economic efficiency. One key figure for economic efficiency, used in practice, is 
the Return on Security Investments (ROSI). This approach aroused great interest for two main reasons: On the one hand the 
ROSI offers, through a pretended analogy to the Return on Investment (ROI), a solid and well-known basis for investment 
decisions (Mayer 2004, p. 2, Peltier 2001, p. 254) the other hand, the feigned clear statement and simplicity of the key figure 
is emphasized (Nowey et al. 2005, p. 21). 
There is not any standardized definition of the ROSI: next to the usage of different names for the variables and the utilization 
of different input tables, ROSI is computed as an absolute value (Berinato 2006) or a quotient (Mayer 2004, p. 2; 
Sonnenreich et al. 2005, p. 1). Normally the computation as an absolute value is favored (Nowey et al. 2005, p. 20): 
 
R - S + T = ALE  
R - ALE = ROSI  
 
ALE Annual Loss Expectancy 
R Recovery Costs (Sum of the annual costs to recover the loss out of the incidents) 
S Savings (Sum of avoided loss) 
T Tool Cost (Costs of security measures, based on Total Cost of Ownership) 
In addition to this ROSI can be computed as a quotient: 
 





Both variants of the ROSI-concept are based on the ALE-concept, which is combined with the classic TCO-concept for IS 
security investments. Therefore, the ROSI-concept adopts all critical aspects of the two concepts. On the one hand the critics 
of the ALE approach which are discussed above: Critical for a profit measurement of security measures is that only the direct 
costs of a measure and the alteration of the expected loss go into the calculation. Indirect costs caused by changes of the 
productivity through a modification of the processes are neglected. Furthermore the main disadvantages of the classical TCO-
method, such as the non-observance of tax- and interestpayments (vom Brocke 2007, p. 73 f) count for this approach as well. 
The ROSI does not fulfil the claim to be comparable or compatible to the ROI. On the one hand in the absolute value form 
presented above, the reference value of the ROI, the average cost of capital, can not be consulted. 
Soo Hoo tries to improve the ROSI-concept by regarding investment decisions as decisions between different security 
guidelines (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 18). A security guideline is a bundle of many security measures. Soo Hoo compares them to 
each other, regarding the “Net Benefit” (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 18). A quantitative valuation of a security investment shall be 
reached by the “Net Benefit”, with consideration of additional costs, benefits and the changed ALE.  
Only one period of time is considered in all of the above described approaches (Soo Hoo 2000, p. 49; Gordon and Loeb 2002; 
Mayer 2004). Either the mean costs are used or constant (and therefore quite problematic) parameters are assumed. It is not 
possible to represent the complex decision situation in an adequate way with the help of these approaches. Other approaches 
of cost-benefit analyses (CBA) (Butler 2002; Gordon and Loeb 2006; Landoll 2006, p. 372; Mercuri 2003) use classical but 
oversimplifying methods, like the Net present Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), which usually do not 
consider taxes and may lead to wrong decisions. Especially because of the mentioned background of complex approximation 
and evaluation problems of IS security investments, it is incomprehensible that tax and interest are not considered. This 
oversight leads to an unrealistic examination of investment decisions. The very important decision between purchase, leasing 
or outsourcing can not be made without regarding tax and interest payments. Criticizing such approaches is—especially in 




Deriving Requirements for Decision Support 
 
 
The decision-making situation of an IS security investment is affected not only by the direct but also by the indirect 
payments, related by the investment. Next to the variation on the expected loss, all effects on other application systems and 
business processes of a company, based on factual and temporal interdependencies, have to be taken into account (Neubauer 
et al. 2005). It is essential to regard the derivative payments as tax and interest, because of the long-term horizon. To 
underline the importance of considering these payments, one should take the decision between purchase, leasing or 
outsourcing into account. This decision is often driven by effect resulting form, different tax or interest rates. Taxes have to 
be considered because of the ability to attribute costs of negative incidents to the taxes. It can be more efficient to contend 
with the risk than to invest in security measures. According to this, a main requirement for decision models for IS security 
investments is that all relevant, direct and indirect payments in the relevant period of time are adequately considered. Firstly, 
all relevant environmental conditions have to be modelled. They determine the in- and out-payments, and furthermore the 
framework of the investment. Solely the tax rate is displayed here, for simplification. Depending on the chosen alternative, 
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the decision maker can influence the in- and outpayments and the expected loss. Table 1 gives an overview of the relevant 
payments of a decision about IS security investments. 
 
Table 1. Relevant payments of IS security investments 
Point of time
Kind of payment 
t=0 … t=n 
Direct outpayments of the investion    
e. g. hardware   
e. g. software   
e. g. training   
e. g. licences   
e. g. maintenance   
…   
Additional outpayments   
e. g. loss of productivity   
e. g. less motivated employees   
e. g. loss of flexibility   
...   
Additional inpayments   
e. g. 1st level support   
e. g. better image (higher sales via internet)   
…   
Expected loss    
(with and without IS security investment)   
   
Derivative Payments   
Taxes   
Interest payments   
 
The chosen investment alternative has impact on the probability of an incident and on the amount of loss. To evaluate the 
investment, the difference between the expected loss with the investment (with-case) and without the investment (without-
case) is of high relevance. The additional in- and out-payments should be refined as well. Thus, the input factors, which 
determine the payment, become more transparent on another level of aggregation. The connection between different 
alternatives of investment, possible reductions of out-payments and additional in-payments, should be mentioned. With the 
help of security measures, out-payments, for example in the field of user support, can be reduced. Next to this, additional in-
payments should be accounted; a higher level of security (e. g. SSL encryption in an online shop) can result in an increase of 
customers. 
On the other hand, not only the out-payment for the acquisition, but also all direct and indirect ou-tpayments that follow, 
must be regarded. This can result out of a reduced productivity, for example. More indirect out-payments, related to the 
investments in IS security, have to be regarded, too. Customers can be distracted from their purchase by complicated order 
processes, for example. 
For an IS security investment, all relevant tables and their relationships—as shown here—have to be identified. In order to 
enable decision support, all relevant data have to be integrated in one long-term calculation. In the following section we will 








Development of a framework 
 
 
One established method of investment controlling that matches all of the above derived requirements is VOFI (Visualization 
of Financial Implications). Parallel to the consideration of all relevant aspects, the correct illustration and calculation of the 
several periods and the corresponding payments have been identified as a basic requirement for a decision support concept 
for IS security investments. Established methods of investment appraisal should be accessed. Instead of classical methods for 
investment computation NPV or IRR, which are applied in this context from time to time,(Butler 2002; Gordon and Loeb 
2006; Landoll 2006, p. 372; Mercuri 2003) VOFI (Visualization of Financial Implications) is used. VOFI allows a complete, 
standardized and transparent visualization of the investment and provides a correct evaluation, even within multiple periods 
(Grob 1993, p. 50ff.). Special advantages of this investment appraisal tool are the great transparency, which is required due to 
the complexity, uniqueness and expandability of each investment. 
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All relevant in- and out-payments (cp. 3) have to be consolidated to one cash flow series. In addition, the reduced expected 
loss has to be taken into account. In a separate table the series of payments without the investment (without-case), should be 
aggregated. The series of payments is transferred to the VOFI. A VOFI is a collection of all relevant payments in one 
spreadsheet. Next to this, VOFI considers—contrary to other approaches—tax and interest (Grob 1993). The VOFI of the 
investment is shown in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. VOFI of the investment 
Period t=0 t=1 … t=n 
Series of payment     
Internal funds     
Overdraft credt     
+ credit intake     
- redemption     
- debit interest     
Financial investment     
- reinvestment     
+ disinvestment     
+ creditor interest     
Tax payment     
- payment     
+ refund     
Net funding     
Balances     
On overdraft credit     
On financial investment     
Net balance     
 
Interest and interest rates can be considered as differentiated in VOFI. Different types of credits and investment conditions, 
with different interest rates, maturity and kinds of repayments can be taken into account. Different means of financing the 
project can be regarded simultaneously. With those finance instruments, the series of payments is balanced so that a net 
funding of zero occurs. The series of payments, calculated with the interest payments, earnings and the deprecation, results in 
the tax base (table 3) to be multiplied with the tax rate. If the tax base is negative, loss compensation with the rest of the 
company will result in a tax refund for the current investment. The tax rate can be calculated for every company regarding the 
specific circumstances, e.g. different tax rates for subsidiaries in different countries. 
As every investment situation, investments in IT-security are facing the problem of uncertainty as well. Uncertainty can occur 
in different ways in these decision situations. For example the probability of a risk to occur cannot be predicted ex-ante. 
Other uncertain factors comprise the effectiveness of specific security means and the amount of money to be spent in future 
periods. 
Traditional risk ratios (e.g. Mean, Variance) are seen as an insufficient means to summarize varying cash flows from multiple 
aspects. The risk-chance-analysis (Hertz 1964) is an approach to examine the uncertainty of the decision problem by 
simulation. In doing so, multiple factors of uncertainty are modelled with distributions, and the distribution of the target 
figure is evaluated within a simulation run. The so far described scenario servers as a calculation system, as the cash outflows 
and the simulated cash inflows in the VOFI are summarized to financial ratios. The result of the simulation run includes e.g. 
the distribution of the accumulated value of the investment or the resulting return on security investments for specific 
measures. The distribution of the target ratio is transformed into a so-called risk-chance-profile. Risk-Chance-Profiles (Hertz 
1964) make it possible to read off the probability when a target figure is greater than or equal to a critical value. 
 
Table 3. Computation of the depreciations and the taxes 
Period t=1 … t=n 
Calculation of depreciation    
Book value in January    
- depreciation    
Book value in December    
Calculation of tax payment    
Net payment    
- Interest payment    
+ Interest earning    
- Depreciation    
Tax base    
Refunds    
Payments    
 
The balance on financial investment of the last period is the terminal value of the investment. This value should be compared 
to all terminal values of the VOFIs alternatives. If there is only one investment, the terminal value, with the investment (with-
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case), has to be compared to the status quo (without-case). To do this, a VOFI is to be created with the unchanged expected 
loss and an alternative usage of the internal funds with a standard opportunity interest rate. The net terminal value of the 
investment is the difference between the terminal value of the investment and the terminal value of the opportunity (the 
second-best solution) (Grob 1993). The investment should be realized when the net terminal value is positive. 
Constitutive different bundles of security measures can be compared with regard to their terminal value. To enable a broad 
decision support, not only the resulting terminal values can be compared, but also the specific RPCs of each investment 
alternative. In the following section we will introduce an example to illustrate a typical IT-security investment situation 




Application of the framework by an example 
 
 
In the following, the approach described above will be demonstrated on the basis of an example. This example gives a brief 
overview on the mode of operation of the framework. Some assumptions are made in order to simplify the decision situation 
which can be vanished in real applications of this framework. The example is abutted to a case described by Mayer: a 
company with 70,000 employees plans the introduction of new ID cards, based on certificates (Mayer 2004, p. 4f). The 
planning horizon and the expected useful life of the investment are added up to four years. Historical data show that a loss of 
3.4 million euro occurred every past year because of offences. An expert study tells that the sum of annual loss will increase 
by 10% per year, if the company keeps the status quo. Another study shows that in comparable companies 80% of the loss is 
generated by attendance of the employees. It is expected that with the introduction of certificate-based ID cards, especially 
through better assignment possibilities, the attacks on the information systems, along with the attendance of the employees 
will be reduced by 75%. Overall, this leads to an expected loss of 1.36 million euro in the first year. It can be assumed that 
there will be less first level support (e. g. due to forgotten passwords), which will result in savings of 150 euro per user per 
year. The support assumes that these savings will only approach 50% in the first year and be fully realized starting with the 
second year. The introduction of the new ID cards creates outpayments of 11 million euro in t=0 for hard- and software. 
Furthermore, the management assumes 1.5 million euro for integration, 0.3 million euro for testing and 0.2 million euro for 
consulting and initial training courses. During the whole useful life, an out-payment of 1 million euro per year for attendance, 
service and support is calculated. Two employees support the whole project during the entire time (out-payments = 100,000 
euro per year). To finance the project, 7 million euro of internal funds is allocated. The debtor interest rate is 8%, the creditor 
interest rate 5%. The internal funds could be used for another investment and create an interest rate of 7%. The company 
assumes a constant tax rate of 55%. The initial out-payment for hard-and software and all other out-payments in t=0 can be 




Table 4. Series of payment of the example investment 
Point of time 
Kind of payment 
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 
Personal 100,000 € 100,000 € 100,000 € 100,000 € 
Hard and software 11,000,000 €   
Consulting and integration 11,000,000 €   
Testing process 300,000 €   
Training 200,000 €   
Attendance, service and support 1,000,000 € 1,000,000 € 1,000,000 € 1,000,000 € 
Expected loss 1,360,000 € 1,496,000 € 1,645,600 € 1,810,160 € 
Savings 1st level support - € 5,250,000 € 10,500,000 € 10,500,000 € 
Series of payment -
13,000,000 €
-2,460,000 € 2,654,000 € 7,754,400 € 7,589,840 € 
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Table 5. VOFI of the investment 
Period t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 
Series of payment -13,000,000 € -2,460,000 € 2,654,000 € 7,754,400 € 7,589,840 € 
Internal funds 7,000,000 €   
Overdraft credît   
+ credit intake 6,000,000 €   
- redemption 464,500 € 2,782,522 € 2,7252,978 €  
- debit interest 480,000 € 442,840 € 220,238 €  
Financial investment   
- reinvestment 2,424,895 € 5,257,488 € 
+ disinvestment   
+ creditor interest  121,245 € 
Tax payment   
- payment 2,356,289 € 2,453,597 € 
+ refund 3,404,500 € 571,362 €   
Net funding 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 
Balances   
On overdraft credit 6,000,000 € 5,535,500 € 2,752978 €   
On financial 
investment 
2,424,895 € 7,682,383 € 




Table 6. Computation of the depreciations and the taxes  
Period t=1 T=2 t=3 t=4 
Calculation of depreciation     
Book value in January 13,000,000 € 9,750,000 € 6,500,000 € 3,250,000 € 
- depreciation 3,250,000 € 3,250,000 € 3,250,000 € 3,250,000 € 
Book value in December 9,750,000 € 6,500,000 € 3,250,000 € 0 € 
Calculation of tax payment 55% 55% 55% 55% 
Net payment -2,460,000 € 2,654,000 € 7,754,400 € 7,589,840 € 
- Interest payment 480,000 € 442,840 € 220,238 €  
+ Interest earning    121,245 € 
- Depreciation 3,250,000 € 3,250,000 € 3,250,000 € 3,250,000 € 
Tax base -6,190,000    
Refunds 3,404,500 € 571,362 €   
Payments   2,356,289 € 2,453,597 € 
 




Table 7. VOFI of the investment 
Period t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 
Series of payment -3,400,000 € -3,740,000 € -4,114,000 € -4,525,400 € 
Internal funds 7,000,000 €   
Overdraft credît   
+ credit intake   
- redemption   
- debit interest   
Financial investment   
- reinvestment 7,000,000 €   
+ disinvestment 1,309,500 € 1,503,749 € 1,719,417 € 1,958,709 € 
+ creditor interest 490,000 € 398,335 € 293,073 € 172,713 € 
Tax payment   
- payment   
+ refund 1,600,500 € 1,837,916 2,101,510 2,393,978 € 
Net funding 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 
Balances   
On overdraft credit   
On financial 
investment 
7,000,000 € 5,690,500 € 4,186,751 € 2,467,333 € 508,624 € 
Net balance 7,000,000 € 5,690,500 € 4,186,751 € 2,467,333 € 508,624 € 
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The terminal value of the without-case is 508,624 euro (cp. table 7). The net terminal value—difference of the terminal value 
of the investment (TVI) and the terminal value of the opportunity (TVO)—of the investment is: 
 
   TVI-TVO = 7,682,383 € - 508,624 € = 7,173,759 (5) 
 
The positive net terminal value of 7,171,759 € will lead to the recommendation to invest in these security measures. 
In addition to the comparison of the net terminal value TVI and TVO the return on security investments for different 
alternatives with respect to the uncertainty can be compared. Therefore some assumptions on the distribution on relevant 
variables have to be made. For example an assumption regarding the tax rate of future periods or the outpayments for each 
alternative. In the example case, a return on security investment of 33.4% (38.6%) for alternative 1 (2) has been computed. It 
is assumed that the uncertainty regarding the outpayments in future periods can be modeled by standard normal distributed 
variable. Simulation experiments can be applied to display the change of the return on security invesments based on this 
distribution. As a result the probability of this return can be compared for both alternatives. In this case a variation of the 
number of outpayments does not affect the decision suggestion. In every case the return on security investments of alternative 
2 is higher than the one of alternative 1. The overlay chart of the cumulative comparison is displayed in figure 8. 







The assumption of distributed variables can be made for other elements of the calculation too. Depended on the elements and 
their distributions situations may occur where alternative 1 is recommended. 
 
 
Summary and Outlook 
 
With this paper we have introduces a framework for calculating the return on security investments on a capital budgeting 
base. This framework can be applied by decision makers in order to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of IT-security 
measures. A review on existing literature has shown that most of the actual approaches for measuring this return are 
insufficient. Either they neglect important variables or they do not take the long term implications of investments into 
account. Based on the identified requirements we have introduced a framework comprising VOFI as a central method for 
calculating the return on security investments. In order to handle the uncertainty typical for investment situations, we 
proposed simulation methods. These methods enable the use of different distributions for variables of an IT-security 
investment. These Findings can be merged into Risk-Chance-Profiles (RPC) in order to compare different alternatives. We 
demonstrated the application of this framework by an example. 
Further research will focus on two different aspects of this framework. (1) Further body of research will be conducted in 
order to identify relevant variables which drive the return on security investments. Therefore practical cases will be compared 
and data mining methods applied to gain insights in the field. (2) Practical implementations of this method should deliver 
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